under Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention. 3 In each, those states invoked the Court's contentious jurisdiction under the Convention's Optional Protocol and sought stays of the executions pending the Court's final judgement. 4 And in each of the prior cases, the ICJ directed the United States to take 'all measures at its disposal to ensure' that the state's nationals not be executed before its decision. 5 In Avena, however, the Court replaced the qualifier 'at its disposal' with the mandatory 'necessary'. 6 This deceptively trivial change not only represented a victory for Mexico, it also established a unique and vital international precedent. By omitting the qualifier attached to its two prior provisional measures orders, the Court made unambiguous, as Mexico had asked it to, both the 'obligation to be imposed' and the 'required result' of its order. 7 At one level, then, Avena simply reaffirmed an axiomatic principle of international law: a state may not invoke its municipal law or internal legal structure to excuse or justify violations of international law. 8 But for a number of reasons -concerns about its institutional legitimacy, uncertainty about the scope and extent of its provisional measures authority, and deference to sovereignty in a matter as quintessentially within a state's municipal jurisdiction as criminal law enforcement -the ICJ had been curiously reluctant to affirm that principle in its earlier orders.
9 Avena is also the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ after its historic decision in LaGrand holding that such orders create binding legal obligations. 10 Its import as an international precedent, finally, is matched by its significance for and potential effects, legal and political, on the United States.
This article explores the substance and ramifications of the Avena provisional measures order. Section 1 explains the background to the case initiated by Mexico on 9 January 2003, the relief sought on the merits, and the parties' submissions on the request for provisional measures. Section 2 briefly reviews the Court's resolution of 41(I).
6.
Avena Order, supra note 1, para. 59(I)(a respectively the international and domestic dimensions of Avena. I focus on Avena's place in the Court's provisional measures jurisprudence, its potential effects, if any, on the ICJ's perceived institutional legitimacy, and its legal and political consequences for the United States. I conclude by asking the extent to which Avena, like Paraguay's and Germany's actions before it, can or should in fact be understood, as Judge Oda has asserted, as a manifestation of 'abhorrence -by Mexico and othersof capital punishment '. 11 Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the ICJ rendered its decision on the merits in Avena. 12 The Court held that the United States had breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention and, reiterating its formulation in LaGrand, ordered that the United States provide 'by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals'. 13 In Avena, however, the Court went further. It made it clear that the executive clemency hearings by which the United States had claimed to comply with LaGrand 's directive were insufficient.
14 Review and reconsideration, the Court held, must take place by means of 'a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration', and 'it is the judicial process that is suited to this task'. 15 Courts must therefore reconsider the conviction and sentence in each case in which competent authorities violated the Convention and ascertain whether the violations 'caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice'. 16 While many aspects of the ICJ's final judgement in Avena invite scholarly consideration, this article limits itself to analysis of the provisional measures order, which merits review in its own right. Second, in part because of these geopolitical factors and in part because of the precedents established by LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the form and substance of Mexico's arguments departed significantly from the ParaguayGermany model. Mexico's application, for example, reviewed in detail the activities and obligations of Mexican consular officers in the United States, focusing on their historic role in protecting Mexican nationals in conflict with the law. 23 Mexico further explained that its municipal law requires consuls to protect the rights of Mexican nationals, 24 including by providing advice, securing interpreters and competent local counsel, locating evidence, communicating with family members and witnesses, and attending legal proceedings -functions that, Mexico asserted, 'literally can make the difference between life and death for Mexican nationals prosecuted for capital crimes'. 25 Finally, Mexico's application detailed Mexico's prior efforts to obtain relief for its nationals convicted of capital offences after proceedings that failed to respect Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. These included actions in US courts, federal and state, and diplomatic overtures to the federal and state governments of the United States. Mexico explained, however, the municipal law barriers to relief under US law and the persistent failure of its diplomacy to secure anything more than pro forma apologies issued after the executions of its nationals had been carried out. When Mexico filed suit on 9 January 2003, it therefore did not represent an isolated foreign-policy decision. Nor did Mexico simply chance to be the next state after Germany and Paraguay to find one of its nationals facing capital punishment after a conviction in United States courts following proceedings that failed to comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Mexico's suit rather represented the next step in, and perhaps the culmination of, its ongoing efforts to secure the consular rights of its nationals in the United States -a process that continues at the domestic legal and international political levels.
THE BACKGROUND TO MEXICO'S ACTION AND THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

The application instituting proceedings
Mexico's application and request for provisional measures reflected these facts. Paraguay's and Germany's applications totalled less than ten pages each and contained few legal citations. Mexico's application ran to more than 70 pages and contained scores of citations, resembling a hybrid complaint and memorandum of law. Paraguay's and Germany's applications concerned individual cases. claimed in the past to be obstacles to enforcement imposed by the federal structure and municipal laws of the United States. 40 In short, Mexico sought to impress on the Court that the qualifier 'at its disposal' would be doubly superfluous: first, because of the irrelevance of municipal law constraints to the international responsibility of the United States; and second, because even a cursory review of that municipal law belied the asserted inability of the federal government to ensure that its constituent states comply with the ICJ's order. 41
The provisional measures hearing
After the first round of oral submissions at the provisional measures hearing on 21 January 2003, 42 Mexico pointed out an evident tension in the United States' position on this score: on the one hand, it agreed that its municipal law should play no role in the Court's decision; on the other, it explained 'the complications of federalism and . . . suggest[ed] that in fact those complications were somehow a reason to repeat the formulation' adopted by the Court in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 43 In this regard Mexico reminded the Court that 'from the standpoint of international law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activity of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures'. 44 The United States did not directly take issue with the legal principles set forth by Mexico. Nor did it contest jurisdiction, perhaps recognizing that its arguments on this issue would fare no better at the provisional measures stage than in the nationals presently remain on death row,' Request, supra note 7, para. 26; (3) that federal courts may enjoin actions by the constituent states in violation of federal law, including treaty obligations, Request, supra note 7, para. 27 (citing Asakura v. Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924) (enjoining enforcement of municipal ordinance in violation of treaty with Japan)); (4) that the President may issue an executive order requiring compliance with federal law, including international law, Request, supra note 7, para. 28 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 US 654 (1982)); and (5) that the Attorney General of the United States may bring suit against the constituent states to enforce treaty obligations, see Request, supra note 7, para. 29 (citing, inter alia, United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928-9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 801 (1982)). 40. See, e.g., Memorial of the United States of America, 27 March 2000, paras. 121-127, in LaGrand (describing constraints on the federal government's ability to ensure compliance with the ICJ's order allegedly imposed by its federal constitutional structure); see also ibid., para. 118 (asserting that 'By immediately transmitting the Order to the Governor of Arizona, the United States placed the Order in the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have had legal authority to stop the execution'). 41. Mexico therefore expressly asked the ICJ to impose an 'obligation of result' -the precise kind of orderindeed the precise language -that the Court had disclaimed in reviewing the nature of the obligation that its provisional measures order in LaGrand had imposed. See LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 115. 42. As an initial matter, Mexico argued that it met the requirements for provisional measures under Art. 41 of the ICJ Statute, which authorizes the Court 'to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party'. cases of Paraguay and Germany. 45 It instead contended that the order Mexico sought would be an exorbitant exercise of the ICJ's provisional measures authority: Mexico 'ask[s] this Court to intrude deeply into the entire criminal justice system of the United States', to 'begin dictating the outcomes of criminal cases'. 46 The United States further argued that the order requested by Mexico would be at odds with the remedy for Article 36 violations articulated in LaGrand, 'review and reconsideration' of the conviction and sentence taking account of the violation. 47 Provisional measures, the United States maintained, could not provide interim relief that would exceed the maximum remedy on the merits to which a state might be entitled. 48 Because, the United States argued, LaGrand entitles Mexican nationals only to review and reconsideration, 49 a stay could not be deemed a measure to preserve Mexico's rights or those of its nationals; for those rights, by hypothesis, do not exist.
By making this argument, however, the United States conflated two issues: the standards for granting provisional relief under Article 41, on the one hand, and the remedy on the merits for the violations alleged by Mexico, on the other. Circumstances may well exist in which the Court's ability to render full relief on the merits to one party requires that it preserve the status quo, even if that necessitates an order that implicates legal rights that may not, strictly speaking, belong to that party (or even exist). Mexico may not, for example, have had a right to vacatur of the convictions and sentences of its nationals, a form of relief that the Court indeed ultimately declined to order in its decision on the merits. But to execute Mexico's nationals before the Court had the opportunity to rule on the merits would plainly have precluded the ICJ from finally awarding them any form of meaningful relief, except, perhaps, for ex post facto compensation. Equally, it would have improperly anticipated a judgement on the merits. 50 To sustain its argument, the United States also put itself in an awkward litigation posture. By contending that neither Mexico nor its nationals possess the rights that Mexico sought, by its request for provisional measures, to preserve, the United States assumed the burden to establish, on the merits, two controversial legal propositions at the provisional measures stage: first, that LaGrand entitles Mexican nationals only to 'review and reconsideration', neither more nor less; and second, that the executive clemency hearings by which the United States purported to implement LaGrand constitute 'review and reconsideration ' . 51 Yet those very propositions tend to invest the Court with rather than divest it of jurisdiction and authority to order 45 54 Conversely, the Court noted the United States' contrary argument about the nature of the obligations imposed by LaGrand and its representation that it had been complying with those obligationsreview and reconsideration -by executive clemency processes. 55 Having concluded that a genuine dispute exists, and hence that it possessed prima facie jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol, 56 the Court proceeded to analyze whether an indication of provisional measures would unduly prejudice the United States. The ICJ reiterated that its 'function . . . is to resolve international legal disputes between States, inter alia when they arise out of the interpretation or application of international conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal', but after the LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations orders, it responded confidently, if simply, that it 'may indicate provisional measures without infringing these principles'. 57 The Court found that the three cases cited in Mexico's request as presenting the most imminent risks of executions satisfied the requirement of urgency. It held, however, that at that juncture it would be needlessly sweeping to stay the executions of all 54 Mexican nationals enumerated in Mexico's application. 58 In the operative paragraph of its order the Court therefore, unanimously, indicated: 67 But however accurate the ICJ's repeated disclaimer that it will not act 'as a court of criminal appeal', 68 to stay criminal sentences will inevitably be perceived by some observers and commentators as an illegitimate or exorbitant exercise of the Court's provisional measures authority -if only because, in effect, it may seem indistinguishable from the relief that a municipal appellate court might order. An international stay of municipal criminal proceedings is unquestionably an unusual exercise of provisional measures authority. It is therefore worth asking whether Avena, like its predecessor orders, augurs an inappropriate level of interference by the ICJ in the sovereign affairs of those states from which its jurisdiction and authority derive.
In general, provisional measures affect matters readily understood as traditional concerns of international law: the rights and duties of states vis-`a-vis one another. In Nuclear Tests, 69 for example, the ICJ ordered France to refrain from 'nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out on Australian territory'. In Passage Through the Great Belt, 70 it denied Finland's request for an order that Denmark 'refrain from continuing or otherwise proceeding with . . . construction works in connection with the planned bridge project over the East Channel of the Great Belt as would impede the passage of ships . . . to and from Finnish ports and shipyards'. In Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 71 it instructed those states to take no action prejudicial to its adjudication of their dispute over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula. Each thus involved quintessentially inter-state issues -transboundary environmental harms, the law of the sea, and frontier and maritime boundaries, respectively. The acts sought to be stayed implicated the rights of states qua states.
In Avena, by contrast, as in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Court ordered the United States to stay acts -the imposition of criminal the United States in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provisional measures hearing, counsel for Paraguay observed that were the contrary argument accepted, 'it would be necessary to reproduce the Articles on State Responsibility in every treaty, and surely that is not the expectation of treaty drafters. Instead, the fundamental understanding with respect to remedies is part of a legal context in which any treaty must operate.' 67. See Request, supra note 7, paras. 15-16 (quoting LaGrand Order, supra note 2, para. 19 (3 March)). This is not to suggest that either Paraguay or Germany deliberately failed to submit their requests 'in good time'; it is only to point out that Mexico sought to heed LaGrand 's directive concerning the timely submission of requests for the indication of provisional measures. 68. Avena Order, supra note 1, para. 48 (citing LaGrand Order, supra note 2, para. 25); see also Yet Avena's alleged intrusion into municipal law should not be understood as a radical departure from the Court's conventional practice. The Vienna Convention and its subject matter (consular relations) implicate the international rights of Mexico and the United States qua states. The regulation of consular relations between states has been a vital function of international law since its modern evolution following the Peace of Westphalia.
74 Avena therefore did no more than preserve certain treaty rights in connection with a traditional subject of international concern, pending the Court's final judgement. 75 That it incidentally may have impeded the usual progression of criminal proceedings in the United States remains, as a matter of international law, irrelevant.
76 The ICJ's order in Avena, like those in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, may be unusual insofar as it affects a matterthe operation of a state's criminal laws -ordinarily outside the scope of international concern. That alone, however, does not make it either unprecedented or an abuse of the Court's authority under its Statute.
Precedential value
How should the Court's substitution of 'necessary' for the qualifier 'at its disposal' be understood? Mexico argued adamantly for that change, and the Court acceded to its request. To understand why, it should first be emphasized that the Court's decision to insert 'at its disposal' in the LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations orders did not arise in a vacuum. In the latter case, Paraguay had asked the ICJ to order 'that the Government of the United States take the measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Breard not be executed pending the disposition of this case'. 77 But the Court nonetheless chose to limit its order to those measures at the United States' 'disposal'. That formulation had appeared, in substance, in prior provisional measures orders in which a state's ability to comply might reasonably be subject to doubt. 78 LaGrand, however, resolved the most fundamental of these issues, changing the legal landscape in which the Court considered Mexico's request. There, the Court held that 'the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court'. 81 Observing that its order 'was not mere exhortation', the Court then reviewed the measures taken by the United States and ruled that it did not take 'all measures at its disposal' to prevent the execution of the German national Walter LaGrand pending the Court's decision on the merits. 82 The Court qualified its judgement in LaGrand, however, with language that presaged Mexico's request. It noted the United States' representation that its ability to comply had been constrained by 'the character of the United States as a federal republic of divided powers', a system in which, the United States asserted, only the Governor of Arizona had the power to stay an execution imposed under Arizona law. 83 The Court evidently deferred to this representation, emphasizing that it had 'not require [ to forbear from flipping the switches on electric chairs or injecting lethal substances into persons -for the time necessary for the Court to consider and decide Mexico's application on the merits. The physical capacity of the United States to obey that order could not be doubted. Its legal capacity, by contrast, the sole capacity that could be doubted, remained irrelevant as a matter of international law.
By its agreement with that proposition in the Avena provisional measures order, the ICJ reaffirmed a vital and indispensable principle governing the relationship between international and municipal law, while at the same time manifesting a newfound confidence in its provisional measures authority in the wake of LaGrand. The Court's accession to Mexico's request that it replace 'at its disposal' with 'necessary', finally, may suggest some frustration with the United States' disregard of the Court's two prior provisional measures orders in the Vienna Convention trilogy. In both, it will be recalled, the United States pleaded deficiencies in its municipal law and federal structure as justification for the failure of the competent authorities of its political subdivisions to comply with the Court's orders.
The implications for the ICJ's authority and institutional integrity
Avena is the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ after its historic decision in LaGrand holding that provisional measures orders establish binding obligations. How the United States responded to it may therefore have affected the Court's perceived institutional integrity and authority in a way that responses before LaGrand did not. As it happened, no conflict between the Court's provisional measures order and the insistence of one of the states on carrying out an execution arose during the period of the order's effect. But it is worth asking, as a matter of international law, what legal consequences defiance of the ICJ's provisional measures order could have produced. First, in view of the International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 86 it is conceivable that the Court could have held the United States internationally responsible for the execution of one or more Mexican nationals carried out in disregard of its order even had it later determined, on the merits, that Mexico had no absolute right to the vacatur of their sentences, as indeed was the case. 87 Article 48(2) suggests that Mexico could invoke the United States' international legal responsibility in this regard, not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of 'the beneficiaries of the obligation breached', which could include, for example, the family of the deceased Mexican national. At the same time, Article 48(2) 'does not make clear whom the [beneficiaries of the obligation breached] include and the commentary does not elaborate on this point', making it difficult to predict how this provision, which one commentator has said 'expands the domain within which state responsibility 86. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8, ('commending' the Articles 'to the attention of Governments'). 87. Cf. Oxman and Aceves, supra note 36, at 217 (observing that, after LaGrand, 'the Court could conceivably grant a provisional measures order in a case where it subsequently determines that it lacks jurisdiction', and 'If violated, a provisional measures order could impose liability on a state even if the Court lacked jurisdiction in the underlying dispute'); accord J. operates and in this sense represents progressive international legal development', may be applied in the future.
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Second, some observers feared that, after LaGrand, another failure or refusal by the United States to comply with an ICJ provisional measures order, whether because of an alleged inability or unwillingness to control the acts of its constituent political subdivisions, portended a threat to the ICJ's institutional authority. While this scenario never materialized, the fear appears, in any event, to have been overstated, if not unfounded. The United States undoubtedly possessed the ability to comply with the Court's order. 89 The sole question raised by the Avena provisional measures order, as by the orders in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, was of political will. The United States, like most states, abides by most of its international obligations most of the time. 90 Most international obligations, however, do not bear as heavily on the internal politics of a state as do those that implicate capital punishment in the United States, which remains a highly controversial political issue. The effect of the Avena provisional measures order on the right of the United States' constituent states to carry out the death penalty therefore may have raised the internal political costs of compliance to the federal government. Unlike most provisional measures orders, Avena mandated action (or forbearance) that affected the internal politics and mores of a state in an area that provokes strong emotional responses from the citizens who comprise the body politic in a democracy. This helps to explain, which is not to say to justify, the dismal record of compliance by the United States in the two prior Vienna Convention actions before the ICJ.
Finally, some expressed the related fear that the Avena provisional measures order and its predecessors threatened the institutional integrity of the Court. In this regard the United States has repeatedly raised the spectre that the ICJ would be forced to act as an international court of criminal appeal -that foreign nationals would flock to the Court with Vienna Convention claims in an effort to void valid criminal sentences imposed under municipal laws, sinking the Court in a quagmire threatening its role in the peaceful, consensual resolution of inter-state disputes. rand (contesting the admissibility of Germany's second, third, and fourth submissions on the ground that 'Germany seeks through those claims to have the Court play the role of ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings', a function that 'would improperly transform and expand the Court's role, making it the overseer of national judicial systems in criminal cases'); see also Oral Submissions of the United States of America, 7 April 1998, in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, para. 47 (cautioning that 'Once the Court opens itself to this process, it can be expected that a great many defendants will press the States of their nationality to take recourse to it', including 'not only those who received no But despite the three cases involving Vienna Convention violations to date, the risk that a spate of similar applications will flood the Court appears overstated. The political costs of suing the United States remain high, for most states prohibitively so, 92 and diplomacy remains the paramount tool for resolving treaty disputes.
DOMESTIC APPRAISAL: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
As it happened, neither Texas nor Oklahoma, the two states directly affected by the Court's provisional measures order in Avena, took steps to carry out an execution of one of the Mexican nationals protected by the order. We can therefore do no more than speculate about what the federal government's response would have been.
At the time, it said little. The US State Department was reportedly 'studying the order'. 93 This muted response suggests that the United States had hoped, above all, to prevent the Avena order and its potential fallout from becoming headline news, particularly at a time when both the perceived unilateralism and international exceptionalism of the United States, on the one hand, and increasing scrutiny of the death penalty process within the United States, on the other, remain controversial issues. The state of Texas, by contrast, was less reticent. A spokesman for Governor Richard Perry remarked, 'According to our reading of the law and the treaty, there is no authority for the federal government or the World Court to prohibit Texas from exercising the laws passed by our Legislature.'
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The federal government's past responses to provisional measures orders in the Vienna Convention trilogy had not been encouraging. In Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, its response can euphemistically be characterized as schizophrenic. On the one hand, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged the Governor of Virginia to stay the execution '[i]n light of the [ICJ's] request, the unique and difficult foreign policy issues, and other problems created by the Court's provisional measures', including that a refusal to comply could cause 'negative consequences for the many US citizens who live and travel abroad' and 'lead some countries to contend incorrectly that the US does not take seriously its obligations under the consular notification at all, but also those who may wish to claim that the notification received was deficient, incomplete, or tardy'). Convention'. 95 That alone should have sufficed to compel the governor to stay the execution -although the ambiguity of Secretary Albright's letter on the issue of the binding effect of ICJ orders arguably weakened its influence. But as Louis Henkin wrote in the aftermath of Governor Gilmore's decision to ignore the ICJ's order despite Secretary Albright's request, 'states are bound by US foreign policy decisions even if they do not take any formal form'; and under the Constitution treaty obligations of the United States bind state officials, such as Governor Gilmore, no less than federal officials. 96 Scholars have also noted that the federal government had an ample variety of other means at its disposal to enforce the ICJ's order. 97 On the other hand, Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman submitted an amicus curiae brief to the US Supreme Court urging it to deny certiorari and to refuse to stay Breard's execution. Waxman argued that provisional orders do not impose binding obligations and that, in any event, Paraguay lacked a cognizable federal right of action to seek to enforce those obligations. 98 The Supreme Court, in turn, denied certiorari in a brief per curiam order that elided a host of complex issues raised by the related actions of Breard and Paraguay. 99 That it refused to 'delay the execution, grant certiorari, and hear plenary briefing and argument', as several scholars have emphasized, seems incredible, 'if only out of simple comity to the ICJ'. 100 At the state level, Governor Gilmore of Virginia said that he believed his first obligation as governor to be 'to ensure that those who reside within [Virginia's] borders . . . may conduct their lives free of crime'. 101 In addition, he explained, he preferred to carry out Breard's execution on schedule because, should the ICJ rule in Paraguay's favour, it would be more difficult for him to carry out the execution at that point. 102 Of course, in one sense, 'It is neither surprising nor particularly objectionable that the Governor of a state believes he owes his primary duty to its citizens.'
As counsel for Paraguay emphasized in
103 At the same time, it is ironic, if not reprehensible, that the federal government did not intervene on behalf of the United States to vindicate national interests in the face of a parochial state decision. The threat of foreign hostilities inherent in a disunited central government incapable of compelling state adherence to international obligations permeates The Federalist Papers. 104 For this reason, among others, it became 'one of the main objects of the constitution to make [the United States], so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation'. 105 The United States' response to the LaGrand order, while perhaps more understandable in view of the time constraints under which it operated, nonetheless seems equally deplorable. As the Court noted in its final judgement, even assuming the truth of the United States' protestations of its limited capacity to enforce the order in the face of recalcitrant state conduct, the federal government did not take 'all measures at its disposal' to stay Walter LaGrand's execution. 106 Again, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Vienna Convention does not 'furnish a basis . . . to grant a stay of execution' and that 'an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief'.
107 And again, the Supreme Court denied Germany's motion for leave to file an original bill of complaint and refused to stay the execution, giving short shrift to the arguments advanced by Germany.
108 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, observed in dissent, first, that comity counselled a stay because 'both the ICJ and a sovereign nation have asked that we stay this case'; and, second, that a stay 'would give us time to consider, after briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdiction and international legal issues involved', 109 noting that the majority's terse dismissal of the potentially complex issues raised 'suggest[ed] a need for fuller briefing'. 110 In view of this record, what could have been expected had a state elected to proceed with the execution of a Mexican national protected by the Avena order? The United States plainly hoped to avoid that scenario, and it did. But had it arisen, the principle difference would have been the change in the order's phraseology. Because of the substitution of 'necessary' for 'at its disposal', no longer could the United States plausibly maintain, as it did in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, that by urging a state governor to stay the execution, it had taken all the measures 'at its disposal'. Nor could it have argued that its federal structure and municipal laws disabled it from ensuring compliance with the Court's order. In short, had the United States elected to disregard the Court's provisional measures order in Avena, it would not have been able to invoke the fiction of federalism constraints as a veneer for its political decision not to comply.
Informally, however, the United States may have taken steps to avoid being placed in that awkward situation. In May 2003, William Howard Taft IV, Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, addressed the National Association of Attorneys General to emphasize the extent to which 'legal work at every level of government is being influenced by international law and activities' generally, and in particular by the contentious issue of the death penalty. 111 In his address, he emphasized the need to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention as the law of the land and to inform state and local officers of their international obligations in this regard. He also explained Avena and its predecessor actions. Perhaps tellingly, he remarked that 'those of you who are Attorneys General of [those states in which Mexican nationals enumerated in Mexico's application remain on death row] should have received a letter from me advising you of this case, and of the fact that we will need your help in defending the United States'. 112 The State Department may therefore have taken steps to avert the situation it faced in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The federal judiciary never directly faced a conflict with the Avena order. But in Torres v. Mullin, the Supreme Court, while not confronted with Torres's imminent execution in violation of the Avena provisional measures order, denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, again over the strong dissent of Justice Breyer. 113 Justice Breyer, after reviewing the legal arguments made by Torres and Mexico, observed incisively that 'The answer to Lord Ellenborough's famous rhetorical question, "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?" may well be yes, where the world has conferred such binding authority through treaty.' 114 In Loza v. Mitchell, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, while denying the habeas petitioner's motion for suspension of the briefing schedule, said: 'Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the United Mexican States' complaint, or the potential impact of a favorable ruling on petitioner's case, this Court recognizes the benefits of maintaining the status quo in these habeas corpus proceedings pending resolution of the International Court of Justice proceedings.'
115 At least one other federal district court has paid serious attention to LaGrand, 116 and more may follow suit in the aftermath of the Avena judgement.
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In the final analysis, compliance with the Avena provisional measures order would likely have depended on the federal government's political assessment of the relative consequences of its action vis-`a-vis the states and its domestic political constituency, on the one hand, and the states and the international community, on the other. The former tend to support capital punishment, at least in those states affected by Avena. The latter oppose capital punishment categorically and with increasing vehemence. As Harold Koh, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, recently emphasized, 'Simply put: no other civilized, democratic government that has a commitment to human rights resorts to the death penalty in the way we do.'
118 Those states would likely have perceived a decision not to comply with Avena as another example of the United States' disregard for international law generally and of the Bush administration's strident unilateralism. At a time when the United States requires the international co-operation of states to combat terrorism and rebuild and establish stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, to have flouted the Avena order overtly would have imposed serious political costs on the federal government.
Unqualified cynicism should be avoided, however. The Avena order, and now the ICJ's decision on the merits, may well produce positive long-term effects along two dimensions. It may contribute to the growing normative trend in international jurisprudence towards abolition of the death penalty or, at a minimum, the imperative to employ the most exacting standards of due process in states that continue to impose capital punishment. And within the United States, the desire to avoid similar future conflicts with states like Mexico may raise the level of compliance with the Vienna Convention, whatever the United States' future response to its international legal obligations under the Statute of the ICJ, the Convention, and judgements rendered pursuant to the Court's jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol.
Taft's public address to the National Association of Attorneys General, for example, is unusual. After Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the State Department, as it emphasized to the Court in LaGrand, 119 initiated a programme to disseminate broadly a manual on consular notification and to distribute pocket cards for use by law enforcement agents. 120 It seems less likely that the State Department would have taken such steps to increase the level of knowledge and compliance with the Vienna Convention were it not for the trilogy of cases culminating in Avena. In 1999, moreover, California enacted a law mandating that state and local police inform foreign nationals of their consular rights under Article 36 within two hours of their arrest or detention. 121 Finally, some courts have begun to acknowledge LaGrand and give it persuasive, if not binding, effect. 122 These developments suggest that Avena, too, whatever its reception at the formal political level, may produce positive long-term effects normatively and at the practical level of implementation of Vienna Convention obligations within the United States.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, it is worth asking a related question about the relation of Avena and the prior Vienna Convention actions to the maintenance of capital punishment by the United States: is Judge Oda right? At bottom, is Avena really about 'abhorrenceby Mexico and others -of the death penalty'? A principal reason why the United States retains the death penalty despite the trend towards its worldwide abolition is that it has relegated the decision to local democratic politics. Whereas political elites abolished the death penalty in most states in western Europe and elsewhere -and its abolition has been required as a condition of membership of the European Union, for example -political constituencies in many states of the United States have elected to retain the death penalty when it has been put to popular vote. Until abolition becomes customary international law or the Supreme Court declares capital punishment unconstitutional, that arguably remains a decision, as the United States repeatedly asserts, for its body politic rather than the international community.
But while the United States perhaps presently can, as a matter of international law, preserve the institution of capital punishment, it cannot avoid the consequencesincluding, increasingly, the international consequences -of that decision. Because most states find it abhorrent, as Judge Oda wrote, Mexico's insistence that its nationals facing capital punishment receive the maximum level of due-process protection to which international law entitles them is understandable. Even if the United States can continue to resort to the death penalty, it must now factor into its assessment of that punishment's value the escalating political, diplomatic, and financial costs it will incur in the course of litigating compliance with the Vienna Convention (and perhaps other international instruments) before the ICJ and other international bodies, 123 just as it must in defending capital punishment in diplomatic and international human rights fora. 124 Avena, in the final analysis, therefore manifests the tension both (i) between international and domestic punitive norms; and (ii) between, on the one hand, the demands of international law in an increasingly globalized world that facilitates the cross-fertilization of legal and moral norms and, on the other, those of internal politics in a popular democracy. The ICJ, Avena and its predecessors suggest, can play a non-trivial role in resolving those tensions. Of course, the Inter-American Court interpreted consular rights within a distinct treaty-based framework, the very object of which is to codify human rights standards. American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, 1114 UNTS 123. But a strong argument can be advanced that some robust conception of due process in criminal cases, particularly those that implicate the death penalty, has become customary international law. If that is correct, then just as the Court can and should interpret the Vienna Convention within the context of general principles of customary international law on state responsibility and remedies, equally it can and should consider the Convention within the context of the customary international law of human rights. 124. See Koh, supra note 100, at 1104-6 (documenting widespread condemnation of the United States' resort to the death penalty and the severe diplomatic and political costs it imposes in the arena of foreign relations).
